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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

Does plaintiff's failure to raise the "dual

capacity" doctrine argument in the Court below preclude him from
raising that argument in this appeal?
2.

Is plaintiff's claim against Mr. Iversen barred

because they were co-employees, regardless of the "dual capacity"
doctrine?
3.

Has plaintiff stated a claim against Mr. Iverson

arising out of his Motor Carrier Leasing Agreement?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a personal injury action arising out of a
construction accident which occurred September 5, 1986.
Plaintiff sued both the general contractor, James Cape & Sons
Company, and defendant Iversen.
Plaintiff's claim against defendant Iversen was
dismissed upon motion for summary judgment May 29, 1990. The
dismissal order included certification pursuant to Rule 54(b) of
the dismissal as a final judgment and is here on appeal. The
case as against James Cape & Sons Company is ongoing before the
District Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

James Cape & Sons, Inc. (Cape) was the general

contractor for the paving of a portion of 1-15 located near
Beaver, Utah.

The Ralph Smith Company (RSC) was a subcontractor

who provided truck service.
2.

Plaintiff Daniel Smith was employed by RSC as the

foreman on the job.
3.

(D. Smith Depo., p. 13.)

It was plaintiff's job to hire and fire drivers

such as defendant Monroe Iversen and to supervise their
performance.

R S C s trucks picked up wet batch cement at the

cement batch plant and transported it to the paving site.

At the

site, the trucks would back up towards the paving machine and
dump their loads as directed.
4.

(Iversen Depo., pp. 29-37.)

Defendant Iversen, like all other RSC drivers on

the job, worked under an equipment lease agreement.

Under this

agreement, the drivers provided their own trucks and were paid at
an hourly rate.
5.

(Iversen Depo., p. 2 6.)

Most or all of the trucks used by RSC on the job

did not have back up warning devices.
6.

(Iversen Depo., p. 86.)

Plaintiff was apparently aware that the trucks did

not have such devices, having worked with and about them for many
months prior to the accident.

Plaintiff was not aware of any

requirement that they have them.

Plaintiff did not require any
2

of his drivers to obtain back up warning devices on their trucks.
(Dan Smith Depo., p. 60.)
7.

Additionally, the on-site manager for Cape also

had no knowledge of any requirement that the trucks have back-up
devices and took no steps to require such devices.

(Ken Snyder

Depo., p. 28.)
8.

Defendant Iversen takes issue with the unsupported

statement in plaintiff's brief that his truck was defective
because it, like the other trucks, did not have a back up warning
device.

Plaintiff's brief alleges that UDOT standards for the

job required back up devices.

There is no indication that these

standards were ever provided to or brought to Mr. Iversenfs
attention.
9.

Defendant Iversen and the other drivers had

virtually no discretion in the performance of their jobs.

They

were instructed either by Cape personnel or by plaintiff (their
foreman) when to show up on the job and begin driving, when to
quit for the day, when they could take breaks or have lunch, what
route to follow in driving between the cement batch plant
and the paver, where to dump their loads, when to dump their
loads, and when to clean out their equipment.
pp. 81-83.)

3

(Iversen Depo.,

10.

The drivers were all directed by plaintiff to

maintain their CB radio on a certain channel so that plaintiff
could give directions to them at any time.

(Iversen Depo.,

p. 64.)
11.

Defendant Iversen's truck and trailer were

inspected by plaintiff, Cape, and representatives of UDOT at
various times throughout the job.

(Iversen Depo., pp. 69, 87-

90.) No one ever told him he should get a back up warning for it.
ACCIDENT
12.
job.

The day of the accident was the last day of the

The paving work had almost reached the location of the

cement batch plant.

It was only necessary to drive 1,000 to

1,500 yards from the batch plant to the paver location. (Iversen
Depo., p. 91.)

The accident occurred when plaintiff was standing

in front of the paver photographing other trucks on the job.

He

was standing in the very location where trucks had to back up to
dump their loads of cement.

Iversen, following directions,

backed his truck to the paver and was unable to see plaintiff.
Plaintiff was hit by the truck as it backed up.

(Iversen Depo.,

p. 51-61.)
DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS
13.

Plaintiff filed a Complaint suing Cape, alleging

that Cape's flag people had improperly directed or failed to
4

direct Iversen as he backed up.

He also sued Iversen, claiming

that Iversen was an independent contractor and that Iversen
breached his duty of due care by:
a.

failing to keep a proper lookout;

b.

operating the dump truck without the presence

of a dump master to guide him, in violation of the
instructions he had received; and
c.

operating his dump truck without back up

warning devices.
(Plaintiff's Complaint,

para. 27, R. 1-6.)

The Complaint makes

no allegations against Iversen as an equipment lessor.
14.

Plaintiff has now conceded that Iversen was a

"statutory employee" of RSC and, therefore, a co-employee of
plaintiff at the time of the accident.

(Plaintiff's Brief,

p. 5.)
15.

Plaintiff now alleges that Iversen is liable to

him under a dual capacity doctrine as a lessor of the truck as
opposed to as a driver of the truck.

(Plaintiff's Brief, pp. 4-

7.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff's Complaint makes no allegations against
defendant Iversen other than negligence in the operation of his
truck.

As pled, the Complaint fails to raise the "dual capacity"
5

argument on which plaintiff now bases his entire appeal.

Having

failed to plead it before the lower court, plaintiff is barred
from raising this new argument at this time.
In addition, Utah has not recognized the dual capacity
doctrine plaintiff now argues.

That doctrine has specifically

been rejected in similar cases by this court and has generally
been rejected by courts across the country.
Finally, the facts of this case show no basis of
liability whatsoever for defendant Iversen as a lessor.

The

equipment he provided was inspected by plaintiff himself on
behalf of RSC.

It was also inspected by UDOT.

It was leased to

RSC following that inspection and was apparently fully
satisfactory to plaintiff and RSC.

The absence of a back up

alarm on the equipment was open and obvious and consistent with
most, if not all, of the other trucks RSC had on the job. There
is no liability of a lessor who leases a truck that fully
conforms with the lessee's requirements.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF HAVING FAILED TO PLEAD ANY CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT
IVERSEN OTHER THAN FOR NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF THE TRUCK, CANNOT
NOW RAISE A NEW CLAIM.
Plaintiff's claim, as pled, sounds only in negligence
as against Mr. Iversen for his operation of the truck.
6

There is

no allegation of some separate duty arising from the leasing
agreement between Iversen and RSC.

The Complaint fails to

suggest any duty Iversen had which was breached under the
Agreement.
A simple review of the facts shows that the equipment
provided by Iversen under the agreement met RSC standards. It
was specifically examined and accepted by RSC through its agent,
plaintiff.
In responding to Iversen's Motion for Summary Judgment
in this case, plaintiff has cast about for a theory of liability
against Mr. Iversen.

The only properly pled theory, however, is

a negligence theory alleging that he is an independent
contractor.

Plaintiff has abandoned that theory. In responding

to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff suggested that Mr.
Iversen was an employee of RSC who had been loaned to Cape.
(R. 187-194)

This position has also apparently been abandoned.

The only mention of a claim against Mr. Iversen as a
lessor in the lower court was made in one paragraph at the end of
plaintiff's responsive memorandum to the motion for summary
judgment.
(R. 192)

There is no allegation of a "dual capacity doctrine."
Plaintiff never moved to amend his Complaint to make

such a claim.

No case law in support of the point was cited.

Additionally, no clarification was given, whatsoever, as to what
7

was the basis of any duty Mr. Iversen would have had under the
lease.
It is inappropriate for an appellate court to consider
a legal theory not clearly raised or pled at the trial court
level.

James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987).

In the

James case, the court commented:
In Utah, matters not raised in the pleadings
nor put in issue at the trial may not be
raised for the first time on appeal.
[Citation.] A matter is sufficiently raised
if it has been submitted to the trial court
and the trial court has had the opportunity
to make findings of fact or law. [Citation.]
"Theories or issues which are not apparent or
readily discernable from the pleadings,
affidavits, and exhibits will not be
considered." [Citation.] In particular,
even if the pleadings are generously
interpreted, if they are not supported by any
factual showing or by the submission of legal
authority, they are not presented for
decision.
746 P.2d at 801.
In the instant case, plaintiff, having failed in a lower
court to raise the "dual capacity doctrine" or to plead a cause
of action for breach of a duty under the lease, may not now raise
this issue.

8

POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S NEW CLAIM AGAINST IVERSEN IS BARRED
BY THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION STATUTES.
As noted above, plaintiff has conceded that Mr, Iversen
was a co-employee with plaintiff under the applicable Utah
Worker's Compensation statutes.1

As such, plaintiff may not sue

Mr. Iversen for his injury, arising from on the job activity.2
Plaintiff now, for the first time, proposes the "dual capacity
doctrine."

Plaintiff suggests that because Iversen1s contract

with RSC required him to provide a truck, that puts him in a
"dual capacity" relationship with plaintiff.

Plaintiff has

directed the Court's attention to no reported case of a similar
circumstance in which the "dual capacity doctrine" was applied.
In those cases where the "dual capacity doctrine" has been
raised before this court, it has consistently been rejected.
Stewart v. CMI Corporation, 740 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1987) and Binaham
v. Lacroon Corporation, 707 P.2d 678 (Utah 1985).

^ t a h Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-42 and 35-1-60.
2

The case of Gallegos v. Strinqham, 442 P.2d 31 (Utah 1968) is
directly on point.
It involved an essentially identical
employment/truck lease agreement.
The truck involved was being
driven on a very similar street paving job.
Plaintiff was an
employee of a contractor on the job and sued, making allegations of
negligence against an owner/operator of one of the trucks. This
court had no difficulty in applying the worker's compensation bar
under the statutory employee rules.
9

The Lagoon case involved a Lagoon esmployee who was
injured when standing in the vicinity of one of the Lagoon rides
known as the Colossus.

The employee sued alleging that Lagoon

occupied a dual capacity, both as a contractor, and as a park
operator.

In rejecting this position, this court stated:
It is sufficient to observe that even those
jurisdictions that recognize and apply the
doctrine would probably not do so here. The
annotator at page 1155 of the annotation
referred to above [23 A.L.R. 4 1163] observes
that attempt by employees to hold their
employers liable for injuries resulting from
the employer's maintenance of unsafe
premises, on the reasoning that the employer
occupies a separate capacity and owes
separate duties to employees as owner of the
premises, have generally been rejected for
the reason that the employer's duty to
maintain a safe workplace is inseparable from
the employer's general duties as an employer
towards his employees. We agree with that
reasoning.

707 P.2d at 680-81 (emphasis added).
The instant case involves a virtually identical
situation.

Mr. Iversen's duty as a co-employee to operate and

maintain his truck in a proper manner was inseparable from any
duty he may have had as a provider of the vehicle.

His providing

the vehicle was part of his employment.
Similarly, in the Stewart case, supra, the court
rejected the dual capacity doctrine.

In that case, it was argued

that the employer, a contractor, had a dual capacity because it
10

also manufactured the equipment that caused plaintiff's injury.
The court rejected this distinction and the application of the
dual capacity doctrine to the case.

If the dual capacity

doctrine does not apply to an equipment manufacturer, it
certainly can't apply to an equipment lessor such as Mr. Iversen.
As noted by this Court in previous cases and the
commentators, the "dual capacity" doctrine is generally very
restrictively applied, if at all.

23 A.L.R. 4th 1151.

It is

clearly not applicable in this case.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF HAS ALLEGED NO THEORY OF LIABILITY AGAINST
DEFENDANT IVERSEN AS A LESSOR.
As noted above, plaintiff's pleadings makje no
allegation of any kind against Mr. Iversen arising from his
contract as a lessor.

The facts are undisputed that plaintiff

himself negotiated the lease contract with Mr. Iversen.

The

plaintiff inspected Mr. Iversen's truck and trailer and accepted
it.

There is no allegation that Mr. Iversen's truck failed in

any way.

The only allegation is that at the time it was leased,

it did not have a piece of equipment known as a backup alarm.
The fact that such an alarm was not in place was obvious to
everyone concerned.
The truck was not defective.
represented.

It performed exactly as

If RSC was obligated to Cape to have backup alarms
11

on its trucks for this particular job, it was RSC's obligation to
see that they were installed.

Plaintiff has specifically

admitted that, as foreman for RSC, he had no understanding that
backup alarms were required to be in place and took no steps to
have any installed.
The fact that plaintiff, or RSC, or Cape, failed to
fulfill some obligation under their contracts with the UDOT on
the road project does not make Mr. Iversen responsible as a
lessor.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has conceded that Mr. Iversen was a statutory
co-employee with plaintiff.

As such, plaintiff is restricted to

his recovery under Workmens Compensation insurance and may not
sue Mr. Iversen.
Plaintiff has cast about in the lower court, and now
presents new theories here attempting to find some basis upon
which to keep Mr. Iversen in this case.

Plaintiff's latest

theory, the "dual capacity doctrine," is not sufficient.

This

doctrine was not raised in the lower court and cannot be raised
for the first time here.

Furthermore, even in those

jurisdictions which have conditionally accepted the doctrine, it
would not apply in a case such as this where Mr. Iversen's
performance as an employee and as a truck lessor were so totally
12

intertwined.

Additionally, there is no indication of any breach

of a duty by Mr. Iversen as a lessor.

The truck he provided was

inspected and accepted by plaintiff himself.

If a backup alarm

was necessary, it was plaintiff's obligation to see that it was
installed.
Judge Sawaya's Order dismissing Mr. Iversen from the
*

case should be affirmed.
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